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	<title>Philosopher's Digest &#187; Clayton Littlejohn</title>
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		<title>&#8220;Warrant and Action&#8221; Mikkel Gerken</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2010 15:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Clayton Littlejohn</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Synthese]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Excuses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reasons for Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Warrant]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=834</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: bold;"><em>Main authors discussed</em></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">:</span> Keith DeRose, John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley, and Timothy Williamson</p>
<p>Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) defend the Knowledge-Action Principle:</p>
<p>(KA) It is proper to treat p as a reason for action (for some p-dependent choice) iff you know p.</p>
<p>Mikkel Gerken defends the&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>&#8220;Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions&#8221; Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/fallibilism-epistemic-possibility-and-concessive-knowledge-attributions-trent-dougherty-and-patrick-rysiew</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 20:29:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Clayton Littlejohn</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fallibilism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: David Lewis and Jason Stanley</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fallibilist claims that it’s possible to know p even if your evidence for believing p does not entail p.  It seems that infallibilism entails scepticism because it seems that we don’t have&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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