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	<title>Philosopher's Digest &#187; Philosophical Studies</title>
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		<title>&#8220;Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons&#8221; Mark Schroeder</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/means-end-coherence-stringency-and-subjective-reasons-mark-schroeder</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/means-end-coherence-stringency-and-subjective-reasons-mark-schroeder#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2009 20:16:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Errol Lord</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Instrumental Rationality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subjective Ought]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subjective Reasons]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=601</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Michael Bratman, John Broome, A.C. Ewing, Kieran Setiya</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Schroeder’s main goal is to begin to develop an interesting view of the coherence requirements of rationality.  He focuses on two coherence requirements, the first of which is the instrumental&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>&#8220;Imagination and Other Scripts&#8221; Eric Funkhouser and Shannon Spaulding</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/imagination-and-other-scripts-eric-funkhouser-and-shannon-spaulding</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/imagination-and-other-scripts-eric-funkhouser-and-shannon-spaulding#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2009 12:00:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Amy Kind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Desire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Imagination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Motivation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pretense]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=603</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Gregory Currie, Ian Ravenscroft, David Velleman, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some philosophers (e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft, Velleman) have recently argued that pretense provides a counterexample to the standard Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM). Pretense behavior is a novel kind of&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>“Single Premise Deduction and Risk” Maria Lasonen-Aarnio</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9csingle-premise-deduction-and-risk%e2%80%9d-maria-lasonen-aarnio</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9csingle-premise-deduction-and-risk%e2%80%9d-maria-lasonen-aarnio#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2009 12:00:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Leo Iacono</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Closure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=560</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">Lasonen-Aarnio argues that a problem that might seem to affect only multi-premise closure (MPC), having to do with the accumulation of risk, is also a problem for single premise closure (SPC).</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">Here are the epistemic closure principles in question, as formulated&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>“Empathy, Social Psychology, and Global Helping Traits” Christian Miller</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9cempathy-social-psychology-and-global-helping-traits%e2%80%9d-christian-miller</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9cempathy-social-psychology-and-global-helping-traits%e2%80%9d-christian-miller#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2009 16:02:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Kevin Timpe</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Character traits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empathy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Virtue]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=342</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Gilbert Harman, John Doris, C. Daniel Batson</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Recent work by both philosophers and social psychologists suggests that agents lack a moral character comprised of robust, global moral dispositions.  According to situationists like Harman and Doris, most individuals overestimate&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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