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	<title>Philosopher's Digest &#187; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</title>
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		<title>&#8220;Seeing Reasons&#8221; Jennifer Church</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/seeing-reasons-jennifer-church</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/seeing-reasons-jennifer-church#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jul 2010 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Amy Kind</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Imagination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Perception]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reasons]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=920</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>I can see the broken window, but can I also see why the window is broken?  In this ambitious and interesting paper, Church argues for an affirmative answer to this question.  Just as we can have perceptual knowledge of a&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>“The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected” G. F. Schueler</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/%e2%80%9cthe-humean-theory-of-motivation-rejected%e2%80%9d-g-f-schueler</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2009 12:42:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Wilson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Motivation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practical Reason]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rationality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reasons]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=426</guid>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><em>Main authors discussed: </em>Michael Smith, Donald Davidson, Phillip Pettit, Thomas Nagel</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">Schueler presents a dilemma for the defender of the Humean theory of motivation. First, let’s define the theory. Schueler focuses on the theory as one that explains why a person&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>“Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox”  Douglas Patterson</title>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2009 12:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Berit Brogaard</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paradox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Semantics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=372</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="MsoNormal"><em><span>Main authors discussed</span></em><span>: Alfred Tarski, Kirk Ludwig, Matti Eklund</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><span>Douglas Patterson argues that the best way to respond to the semantic paradoxes that arise in natural language is to take natural language semantics to be (explosively) inconsistent.<span> </span>According to Patterson, to understand&#8230;</span></p>]]></description>
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		<title>&#8220;Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions&#8221; Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/fallibilism-epistemic-possibility-and-concessive-knowledge-attributions-trent-dougherty-and-patrick-rysiew</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 20:29:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Clayton Littlejohn</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fallibilism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=319</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: David Lewis and Jason Stanley</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fallibilist claims that it’s possible to know p even if your evidence for believing p does not entail p.  It seems that infallibilism entails scepticism because it seems that we don’t have&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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