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		<title>Comment on &#8220;Well-Being and Virtue&#8221; Daniel Haybron by Philosopher&#8217;s Digest &#187; “Happiness, the Self, and Human Flourishing,” Daniel Haybron</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/uncategorized/well-being-and-virtue-daniel-haybron/comment-page-1#comment-111</link>
		<dc:creator>Philosopher&#8217;s Digest &#187; “Happiness, the Self, and Human Flourishing,” Daniel Haybron</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2010 17:39:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=829#comment-111</guid>
		<description>[...] in Haybron’s sense (I address this issue in my review of his “Well-Being and Virtue”reviewed here). Lastly, a very crucial idea here is one that he never discusses directly, viz. the thesis of [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] in Haybron’s sense (I address this issue in my review of his “Well-Being and Virtue”reviewed here). Lastly, a very crucial idea here is one that he never discusses directly, viz. the thesis of [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on “Truth and Public Reason” Joshua Cohen by Dr.Priganica mirsad</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen/comment-page-1#comment-107</link>
		<dc:creator>Dr.Priganica mirsad</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:21:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=774#comment-107</guid>
		<description>truth is quite unnecessary for &quot;public reason&quot;. but at the same time &quot;truth talk&quot; may enrich the discussion.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>truth is quite unnecessary for &#8220;public reason&#8221;. but at the same time &#8220;truth talk&#8221; may enrich the discussion.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Protected: Reviews in Progress by Dan Russell</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/reviews-in-progress/comment-page-1#comment-101</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Russell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 21:41:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Protected: Reviews in Progress by Dan Russell</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/reviews-in-progress/comment-page-1#comment-100</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Russell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 21:38:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Protected: Reviews in Progress by R. Zachary Manis</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/reviews-in-progress/comment-page-1#comment-99</link>
		<dc:creator>R. Zachary Manis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jan 2010 22:00:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Protected: Reviews in Progress by R. Zachary Manis</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/reviews-in-progress/comment-page-1#comment-98</link>
		<dc:creator>R. Zachary Manis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jan 2010 22:10:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Protected: Reviews in Progress by Heath White</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/reviews-in-progress/comment-page-1#comment-97</link>
		<dc:creator>Heath White</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Dec 2009 16:17:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on &#8220;Epistemic Bootstrapping&#8221; Jonathan Vogel by Trent Dougherty</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/jrnlphil/epistemic-bootstrapping-jonathan-vogel/comment-page-1#comment-94</link>
		<dc:creator>Trent Dougherty</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Dec 2009 21:10:26 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Andy, thanks for this: I&#039;m at home today and don&#039;t have the paper with me here (and for some reason it&#039;s not in my electronic library).  

Have you shared these concerns with Jonathan?  You really should, I&#039;d be interested in what he has to say.  

I would have expected him to point to the following plausible asymmetry.  Peter&#039;s premise 2 is *intrinsically* a reason for 1.  2. is a pro tanto reason for 1 in every possible world.  This is not so with Roxanne&#039;s premises 2. and 1.  Whether her 2. supports her 1. is entirely contingent.    

The Milk case is like the Peter case not the Roxanne case.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andy, thanks for this: I&#8217;m at home today and don&#8217;t have the paper with me here (and for some reason it&#8217;s not in my electronic library).  </p>
<p>Have you shared these concerns with Jonathan?  You really should, I&#8217;d be interested in what he has to say.  </p>
<p>I would have expected him to point to the following plausible asymmetry.  Peter&#8217;s premise 2 is *intrinsically* a reason for 1.  2. is a pro tanto reason for 1 in every possible world.  This is not so with Roxanne&#8217;s premises 2. and 1.  Whether her 2. supports her 1. is entirely contingent.    </p>
<p>The Milk case is like the Peter case not the Roxanne case.</p>
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		<title>Comment on “Single Premise Deduction and Risk” Maria Lasonen-Aarnio by walker</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9csingle-premise-deduction-and-risk%e2%80%9d-maria-lasonen-aarnio/comment-page-1#comment-92</link>
		<dc:creator>walker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 23:37:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=560#comment-92</guid>
		<description>But isn&#039;t the &quot;luck&quot; which applies to MPC&#039;s simply different than the &quot;deductive luck&quot; you refer to as presenting a problem for SPCs? And further, it doesn&#039;t seem that there can be some kind of error in deductive logic. This kind of claim strikes me as similar to saying: 

&quot;2+2=4, but the possibility of you saying 2+2=3 [you thought of one instead of two] means that deducing that two two&#039;s is four is vulnerable to the objection that some error must have occurred in our deduction. If the best thing we can conceive of as a possible &quot;lucky&quot; deductive event is a quantum occurrence in the deducer&#039;s brain, couldn&#039;t you just make a deduction twice or three times in order to discredit such arguments?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>But isn&#8217;t the &#8220;luck&#8221; which applies to MPC&#8217;s simply different than the &#8220;deductive luck&#8221; you refer to as presenting a problem for SPCs? And further, it doesn&#8217;t seem that there can be some kind of error in deductive logic. This kind of claim strikes me as similar to saying: </p>
<p>&#8220;2+2=4, but the possibility of you saying 2+2=3 [you thought of one instead of two] means that deducing that two two&#8217;s is four is vulnerable to the objection that some error must have occurred in our deduction. If the best thing we can conceive of as a possible &#8220;lucky&#8221; deductive event is a quantum occurrence in the deducer&#8217;s brain, couldn&#8217;t you just make a deduction twice or three times in order to discredit such arguments?</p>
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		<title>Comment on Protected: Reviews in Progress by Daw-Nay Evans</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/reviews-in-progress/comment-page-1#comment-90</link>
		<dc:creator>Daw-Nay Evans</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2009 04:49:04 +0000</pubDate>
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