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	<title>Philosopher's Digest</title>
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	<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com</link>
	<description>Timely Reviews of Current Philosophy Articles</description>
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		<title>“The Sense of Deity and Begging the Question with Ontological and Cosmological Arguments” Daniel M. Johnson</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9cthe-sense-of-deity-and-begging-the-question-with-ontological-and-cosmological-arguments%e2%80%9d-daniel-m-johnson</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9cthe-sense-of-deity-and-begging-the-question-with-ontological-and-cosmological-arguments%e2%80%9d-daniel-m-johnson#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 15:24:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>R. Zachary Manis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Faith and Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Calvin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cosmological argument]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural theology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ontological argument]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Plantinga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reformed epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rowe]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=807</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: John Calvin, Alvin Plantinga, William Rowe</p>
<p>Reformed epistemology often is thought to be on the opposite end of the theological spectrum from, if not outright opposed to, natural theology.  Johnson, however, aims to demonstrate that Calvin’s view of&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<title>“Kierkegaard and Natural Reason: A Catholic Encounter” Jack Mulder, Jr.</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9ckierkegaard-and-natural-reason-a-catholic-encounter%e2%80%9d-jack-mulder-jr</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9ckierkegaard-and-natural-reason-a-catholic-encounter%e2%80%9d-jack-mulder-jr#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2010 18:39:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>R. Zachary Manis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Faith and Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kierkegaard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural theology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Fragments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rahner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reformed epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rowe]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=811</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Søren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, William L. Rowe, Cardinal Newman, Karl Rahner</p>
<p style="text-align: justify">According to the standard reading, Søren Kierkegaard is a staunch critic of natural theology.  Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s <em>Philosophical Fragments</em>, lampoons all attempts to&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9ckierkegaard-and-natural-reason-a-catholic-encounter%e2%80%9d-jack-mulder-jr/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>&#8220;Warrant and Action&#8221; Mikkel Gerken</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2010 15:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Clayton Littlejohn</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Synthese]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Excuses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reasons for Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Warrant]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=834</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: bold;"><em>Main authors discussed</em></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">:</span> Keith DeRose, John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley, and Timothy Williamson</p>
<p>Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) defend the Knowledge-Action Principle:</p>
<p>(KA) It is proper to treat p as a reason for action (for some p-dependent choice) iff you know p.</p>
<p>Mikkel Gerken defends the&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>&#8220;How We Know What We&#8217;re Doing&#8221; Sarah K. Paul</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophersimprint/how-we-know-what-were-doing-sarah-k-paul</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophersimprint/how-we-know-what-were-doing-sarah-k-paul#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2010 02:18:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Heath White</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophers' Imprint]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anscombe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intention]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intentional action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[practical knowledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Setiya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Velleman]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=794</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed: </em>Anscombe, Velleman, Setiya, Davidson</p>
<p style="text-align: justify">Anscombe was the first philosopher in modern times to note that when we act intentionally, we know what we are doing without observation, under the description(s) on which the action is intentional.  Paul calls&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophersimprint/how-we-know-what-were-doing-sarah-k-paul/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>“Truth and Public Reason” Joshua Cohen</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Dec 2009 22:14:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guido Pincione</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Public Affairs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deliberative democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public reason]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rawls]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=774</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Joshua Cohen argues that a political conception of truth plays a role in public political justification. He draws a distinction between a <em>conception</em> of truth, which consists in a “set of claims about truth—for example, that truth is distinct from warrant,&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>“The Non-identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional” David S. Oderberg</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/analysis/%e2%80%9cthe-non-identity-of-the-categorical-and-the-dispositional%e2%80%9d-david-s-oderberg</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/analysis/%e2%80%9cthe-non-identity-of-the-categorical-and-the-dispositional%e2%80%9d-david-s-oderberg#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Nov 2009 00:09:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Feser</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[act and potency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Categorical]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dispositional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essentialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=768</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Analysis, Volume 69, Number 4 (October 2009), pages 677-684.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Main authors discussed</em>: David Oderberg, Galen Strawson, Alexander Bird, Mark Heller</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Oderberg’s article is a response to Galen Strawson’s “The identity of the categorical and the dispositional” (reviewed previously). Strawson, following Descartes, assumes&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/analysis/%e2%80%9cthe-non-identity-of-the-categorical-and-the-dispositional%e2%80%9d-david-s-oderberg/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge&#8221; William J. FitzPatrick</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ethicsqtrly/moral-responsibility-and-normative-ignorance-answering-a-new-skeptical-challenge-william-j-fitzpatrick</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ethicsqtrly/moral-responsibility-and-normative-ignorance-answering-a-new-skeptical-challenge-william-j-fitzpatrick#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2009 19:04:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vaughn Bryan Baltzly</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Akrasia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culpable ignorance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral responsibility]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=458</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[William FitzPatrick presents a critical assessment of a recent argument for skepticism regarding attributions of moral responsibility.  While he applauds it for drawing our attention to difficult problems surrounding the theory and practice of our attributions of moral responsibility, FitzPatrick concludes that the argument’s skeptical conclusion is too strong.]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ethicsqtrly/moral-responsibility-and-normative-ignorance-answering-a-new-skeptical-challenge-william-j-fitzpatrick/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>“Immigration and Freedom of Association” Christopher H. Wellman</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ethicsqtrly/%e2%80%9cimmigration-and-freedom-of-association%e2%80%9d-christopher-h-wellman</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ethicsqtrly/%e2%80%9cimmigration-and-freedom-of-association%e2%80%9d-christopher-h-wellman#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2009 17:54:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Bas van der Vossen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Borders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Freedom of Association]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=733</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Wellman defends the view that states have an almost unqualified right to admit or keep out immigrants, including refugees.  Wellman argues that this is a direct implication of the freedom of association (henceforth: FoA) of the citizens of a state. &#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ethicsqtrly/%e2%80%9cimmigration-and-freedom-of-association%e2%80%9d-christopher-h-wellman/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Consciousness and its Function&#8221; David Rosenthal</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/neuropsychologia/consciousness-and-its-function-david-rosenthal</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/neuropsychologia/consciousness-and-its-function-david-rosenthal#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2009 13:46:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Richard Brown</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Neuropsychologia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Consciousness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Function]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Higher-Order Thought]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=658</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: David Rosenthal</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT).  Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/neuropsychologia/consciousness-and-its-function-david-rosenthal/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Nonindexical Contextualism&#8221; John MacFarlane</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/nonindexical-contextualism-john-macfarlane</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/nonindexical-contextualism-john-macfarlane#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2009 18:37:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Iris Einheuser</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Synthese]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contextualism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Relative truth]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=661</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Synthese, Volume 166, Number 2 (January 2009), pages 231–250.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Main authors discussed:</em><strong></strong><strong><em> </em></strong>Herman Cappelen, Keith DeRose, Nikola Kompa, Ernie Lepore, Jason Stanley</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On what is arguably the standard view in contemporary philosophy of language, an expression is <em>context sensitive</em> if its semantic contribution to&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/nonindexical-contextualism-john-macfarlane/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
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