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	<title>Philosopher's Digest</title>
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	<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com</link>
	<description>Timely Reviews of Current Philosophy Articles</description>
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		<title>&#8220;Well-Being and Virtue&#8221; Daniel Haybron</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/uncategorized/well-being-and-virtue-daniel-haybron</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/uncategorized/well-being-and-virtue-daniel-haybron#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2010 17:34:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Daniel Russell</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aristotle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eudaimoism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eudaimonia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[happiness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[perfectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Virtue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[well being]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=829</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Originally published in <em>Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</em> volume 2, number 2 (2007), pages 1-27.</p>
<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Daniel Haybron</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this essay, Daniel Haybron discusses what he calls “Aristotelian perfectionism,” which he takes to be a central feature of Aristotelian theories&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
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		<title>&#8220;Marriage Unhitched From the State: A Defense&#8221; Jeremy Garrett</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/public-affairs-quarterly/marriage-unhitched-from-the-state-a-defense-jeremy-garrett</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/public-affairs-quarterly/marriage-unhitched-from-the-state-a-defense-jeremy-garrett#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2010 13:04:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vaughn Bryan Baltzly</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Public Affairs Quarterly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marriage]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=854</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Taking his lead from Robert Nozick (who observes that “the fundamental question … one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there should be any state at all”), Jeremy Garrett investigates, not how the institution of civil marriage should be organized, but whether there should be any such institution at all.  Finding there to be a compelling prima facie case against the institution, and finding two important arguments against this prima facie case to be wanting, Garrett concludes that we should not, in fact, have the institution of civil marriage.  Instead, he defends a view called Marital Contractualism (henceforth ‘MC’), a proposal for a ‘privatized’, ‘dis-established’ marriage regime.]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Constitution of No Authority: Spoonerian Reflections&#8221; Gerard Casey</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/the-independent-review/constitution-of-no-authority-spoonerian-reflections-gerald-casey</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/the-independent-review/constitution-of-no-authority-spoonerian-reflections-gerald-casey#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2010 04:59:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>James Otteson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[The Independent Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Constitutional Interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Contract]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spooner]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=857</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Lysander Spooner, Edmund Burke, David Hume, Henry Sumner Maine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this brief but provocative article, Casey, a professor of philosophy at University College Dublin, revisits the radical argument Lysander Spooner made in his 1867 <em>No Treason: The Constitution&#8230;</em></p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/the-independent-review/constitution-of-no-authority-spoonerian-reflections-gerald-casey/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>“Happiness, the Self, and Human Flourishing,” Daniel Haybron</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/utilitas/%e2%80%9chappiness-the-self-and-human-flourishing%e2%80%9d-daniel-haybron</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/utilitas/%e2%80%9chappiness-the-self-and-human-flourishing%e2%80%9d-daniel-haybron#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 04:23:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Daniel Russell</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Utilitas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eudaimonia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eudaimonism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[happiness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[perfectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[virtues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[welfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[well being]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=830</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Originally published in <em>Utilitas</em> volume 20, number 1 (2008), pages 21-49.</p>
<p><em>Main Authors Discussed</em>: Daniel Haybron</p>
<p style="text-align: justify">This essay offers a provisional account of Haybron’s “self-fulfillment” view of well-being: well-being is the fulfillment of one’s nature as a unique individual. Haybron argues that such a view&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/utilitas/%e2%80%9chappiness-the-self-and-human-flourishing%e2%80%9d-daniel-haybron/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>“The Sense of Deity and Begging the Question with Ontological and Cosmological Arguments” Daniel M. Johnson</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9cthe-sense-of-deity-and-begging-the-question-with-ontological-and-cosmological-arguments%e2%80%9d-daniel-m-johnson</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9cthe-sense-of-deity-and-begging-the-question-with-ontological-and-cosmological-arguments%e2%80%9d-daniel-m-johnson#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 15:24:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>R. Zachary Manis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Faith and Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Calvin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cosmological argument]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural theology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ontological argument]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Plantinga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reformed epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rowe]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=807</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: John Calvin, Alvin Plantinga, William Rowe</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Reformed epistemology often is thought to be on the opposite end of the theological spectrum from, if not outright opposed to, natural theology.  Johnson, however, aims to demonstrate that Calvin’s view of&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>“Kierkegaard and Natural Reason: A Catholic Encounter” Jack Mulder, Jr.</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9ckierkegaard-and-natural-reason-a-catholic-encounter%e2%80%9d-jack-mulder-jr</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9ckierkegaard-and-natural-reason-a-catholic-encounter%e2%80%9d-jack-mulder-jr#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 2010 18:39:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>R. Zachary Manis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Faith and Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kierkegaard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural theology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Fragments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rahner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reformed epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rowe]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=811</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: Søren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, William L. Rowe, Cardinal Newman, Karl Rahner</p>
<p style="text-align: justify">According to the standard reading, Søren Kierkegaard is a staunch critic of natural theology.  Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard’s <em>Philosophical Fragments</em>, lampoons all attempts to&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/faith-and-philosophy/%e2%80%9ckierkegaard-and-natural-reason-a-catholic-encounter%e2%80%9d-jack-mulder-jr/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Warrant and Action&#8221; Mikkel Gerken</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2010 15:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Clayton Littlejohn</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Synthese]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Excuses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reasons for Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Warrant]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=834</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: bold;"><em>Main authors discussed</em></span><span style="font-weight: bold;">:</span> Keith DeRose, John Hawthorne, Jason Stanley, and Timothy Williamson</p>
<p>Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) defend the Knowledge-Action Principle:</p>
<p>(KA) It is proper to treat p as a reason for action (for some p-dependent choice) iff you know p.</p>
<p>Mikkel Gerken defends the&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/synthese/warrant-and-action-mikkel-gerken-2/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;How We Know What We&#8217;re Doing&#8221; Sarah K. Paul</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophersimprint/how-we-know-what-were-doing-sarah-k-paul</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophersimprint/how-we-know-what-were-doing-sarah-k-paul#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2010 02:18:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Heath White</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophers' Imprint]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anscombe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intention]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intentional action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[practical knowledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Setiya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Velleman]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=794</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed: </em>Anscombe, Velleman, Setiya, Davidson</p>
<p style="text-align: justify">Anscombe was the first philosopher in modern times to note that when we act intentionally, we know what we are doing without observation, under the description(s) on which the action is intentional.  Paul calls&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophersimprint/how-we-know-what-were-doing-sarah-k-paul/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>“Truth and Public Reason” Joshua Cohen</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Dec 2009 22:14:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guido Pincione</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Public Affairs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deliberative democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public reason]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rawls]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=774</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Joshua Cohen argues that a political conception of truth plays a role in public political justification. He draws a distinction between a <em>conception</em> of truth, which consists in a “set of claims about truth—for example, that truth is distinct from warrant,&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/ppa/%e2%80%9ctruth-and-public-reason%e2%80%9d-joshua-cohen/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>“The Non-identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional” David S. Oderberg</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/analysis/%e2%80%9cthe-non-identity-of-the-categorical-and-the-dispositional%e2%80%9d-david-s-oderberg</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/analysis/%e2%80%9cthe-non-identity-of-the-categorical-and-the-dispositional%e2%80%9d-david-s-oderberg#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Nov 2009 00:09:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Edward Feser</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[act and potency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Categorical]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dispositional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[essentialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=768</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Analysis, Volume 69, Number 4 (October 2009), pages 677-684.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Main authors discussed</em>: David Oderberg, Galen Strawson, Alexander Bird, Mark Heller</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Oderberg’s article is a response to Galen Strawson’s “The identity of the categorical and the dispositional” (reviewed previously). Strawson, following Descartes, assumes&#8230;</p>]]></description>
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