The Journal of Philosophy, volume CV, number 9 (September 2008), pages 518-539.

Main authors discussed: Stewart Cohen, James Van Cleve, Michael Bergmann (Bergmann discussed in the Appendix)

Jonathan Vogel revisits his bootstrapping argument against reliabilism and defends it from the charge that internalism has the same problem.

Let’s review the bootstrapping argument. Imagine Roxanne is wondering whether or not her gas gauge is reliable. Suppose it is reliable, but Roxanne isn’t aware of this. If reliabilism is true, it seems Roxanne can know that her gas gauge is reliable by using the following argument.

Roxanne’s Track Record Argument

1. The tank is full. (Formed by looking at the gas gauge)
2. The gas gauge reads “FULL” (Perception)
3. The gas gauge reads “FULL” and the tank is full. (Inference)
4. Therefore, the gas gauge worked correctly this time. (Inference)
   (Repeat n times)
5. The gas gauge worked n times. (Inference)
6. Therefore, the gas gauge is reliable. (Induction)

As long as the processes that generate beliefs in (1)-(6) are reliable, then Roxanne can know that the gas gauge is reliable. What’s bizarre is that Roxanne used the gas gauge to come to believe premise (1) in her argument. So, reliabilism seems to permit an impermissible form of reasoning. Call this form of reasoning “bootstrapping.”

It has been alleged that allowing for bootstrapping is not peculiar to reliabilism (Cohen 2002, Van Cleve 2002, and Bergmann 2004). Arguably, any epistemic principle that permits  that justification without requiring antecedent justification for thinking that one’s faculties are reliable will likely permit bootstrapping. Consider some Chisholmian version of internalist foundationalism that holds that the mere fact that something appears red to you can justify you in believing that the thing is red. Peter, like Roxanne, can bootstrap with the following argument.

Peter’s Track Record Argument

1. The ball is red. (Formed by looking at the ball)
2. I am having a visual perception that the ball is red. (Introspection)
3. I am having a visual perception that the ball is red and the ball is red. (Inference)
4. Therefore, vision worked correctly this time. (Inference)
   (Repeat n times)
5. Vision worked n times. (Inference)
6. Therefore, vision is reliable. (Induction)

Vogel maintains that there is a way out for internalism. The version of reliabilism that Vogel criticizes holds that you never need to know about reliability. This never needing to know about reliability is arguably the source of the bootstrapping problem. Vogel maintains that there are two alternatives for the internalist. First, the internalist can maintain that you always need to know about the reliability of the source in order for the source to yield justified beliefs. The worry about this option, as many have noted, is that it seems to lead to skepticism.

The second option would be that you only sometimes need to know about the reliability of the source in order for it to yield justified beliefs. A version of internalism that holds that you only need knowledge of reliability sometimes could avoid bootstrapping without entailing skepticism.

So when do you need to know about the reliability a source? Vogel’s answer is, roughly, when one attempts to bootstrap. He notes that the following is an independently plausible epistemic principle.

(NRC) A belief that an epistemic rule R is reliable cannot be justified by the application of R, i.e., neither the conclusion itself nor any belief which supports the conclusion may be justified in virtue of the application of R.

NRC is basically a prohibition on rule circular reasoning. I assume that Vogel thinks that any version of internalism that allows for NRC as an exception clause can avoid bootstrapping worries. But it’s a bit unclear how the application of NRC is supposed to work. At one point, Vogel claims that Roxanne does not know (1) in her track record argument (p. 526), and given his criterion above it must be because she’s engaged in a bootstrapping argument.

This claim about Roxanne seems to be at odds with what Vogel says in response to what he calls “the rollback problem.” Let’s use Peter to illustrate the roll back problem. The roll back problem is that it seems that if Peter is not justified in believing (6) in his track record argument, then he must not be justified in believing (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) in his track record argument. However, (3) follows from (1) and (2). (4) follows from (3). (5) follows from any n times you repeat tokens of (1)-(3) to reach a token of (4). It seems like (1) and (2) are the only genuine options for the propositions in the track record argument that you are not justified in believing.

Vogel’s response to the rollback problem doesn’t concede (as I thought he might, given what he says on p. 526 about Roxanne) that persons in bootstrapping scenarios aren’t justified in believing their first premise. The track record arguments go astray elsewhere. Vogel gives us another example of a bootstrapping argument involving memory to illustrate his response to the rollback problem. His version of the argument includes variables. To simplify, I’ll fill in the variables.

Memory Track Record Argument:

(M2) I’m out of of milk. (supported by internal memorial evidence)
(M3) I seem to remember that I’m out of milk.
(M4) I seem to remember that I’m out of milk and I’m out of milk.
(M5) Memory is reliable.

Vogel considers two possible responses to the rollback problem. First, one might argue that in order to make the inference from (M4) to (M5) you need to be justified in believing not only that your memory got it right, but also that it is not mistaken. In other words, you need to be justified in believing (M4*).

(M4*) It’s not the case that I seem to remember that I’m out of milk and it’s not the case that I’m out of milk.

The problem with this response, as Vogel notes,  is that (M2) entails (M4*). Embracing this response seems to commit one to denying closure.

Vogel seems more sympathetic to the second response which seems to be as follows. The justification for (M5) conferred by (M4) is merely prima facie. It can be defeated. One of those conditions in which the justification that (M4) confers on (M5) is defeated is when rule circular arguments are being employed. Because the justification (M4) provides for (M5) is defeated, and (M4) does not entail (M5), your lack of justification for (M5) does not imply a lack of justification for (M4). And so you’re not forced to give up (M2).

I have a number of worries about the moves Vogel makes in this paper, but because of space, I’ll note two. Vogel notes that the first response to the rollback problem comes at a high price, denying closure. However, the second response has a cost too. The second response allows you to reach the conclusion that your faculties worked once. Suppose Peter is wondering whether he should trust his perception in a particular instance of having formed the belief that the ball is red. If internalist foundationalism is true, he has a pretty easy method. Just run the track record argument up to premise (4), and he has his answer.

The second worry is that it seems open to an externalist to employ Vogel’s strategy. As Vogel says, it’s independently plausible to suppose that circular reasoning is pernicious, and then he recommends that internalist foundationalists tack on an anti-bootstrapping proviso to their theory. If we assumed that there is nothing objectionable about this strategy, then it seems that reliabilists could take Vogel up on this recommendation too.

Other References:

Bergmann, M. (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(3), 709-727.

Cohen, S. (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 309-329.

Van Cleve, J. (2002). Is Knowledge Easy or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Answer to Skepticism. The Skeptics, Ashgate, Aldershot, 45–59.

Reviewed by Andrew Cullison
SUNY Fredonia