<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Philosopher's Digest &#187; Epistemology</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.philosophersdigest.com/tag/epistemology/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com</link>
	<description>Timely Reviews of Current Philosophy Articles</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 29 Aug 2010 16:07:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.2</generator>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
			<item>
		<title>&#8220;Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error,&#8221; Jennifer Nagel</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-quarterly/knowledge-ascriptions-and-the-psychological-consequences-of-thinking-about-error-jennifer-nagel</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-quarterly/knowledge-ascriptions-and-the-psychological-consequences-of-thinking-about-error-jennifer-nagel#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 14:00:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Leo Iacono</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Quarterly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Heuristic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=875</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p align="left">When attempting to determine whether the subject of an epistemology case has knowledge or mere true belief, many of us find that our judgments are influenced by whether the case explicitly describes a way in which the subject’s belief could&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-quarterly/knowledge-ascriptions-and-the-psychological-consequences-of-thinking-about-error-jennifer-nagel/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>“Single Premise Deduction and Risk” Maria Lasonen-Aarnio</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9csingle-premise-deduction-and-risk%e2%80%9d-maria-lasonen-aarnio</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9csingle-premise-deduction-and-risk%e2%80%9d-maria-lasonen-aarnio#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2009 12:00:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Leo Iacono</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Closure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=560</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">Lasonen-Aarnio argues that a problem that might seem to affect only multi-premise closure (MPC), having to do with the accumulation of risk, is also a problem for single premise closure (SPC).</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">Here are the epistemic closure principles in question, as formulated&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philosophical-studies/%e2%80%9csingle-premise-deduction-and-risk%e2%80%9d-maria-lasonen-aarnio/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Epistemic Bootstrapping&#8221; Jonathan Vogel</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/jrnlphil/epistemic-bootstrapping-jonathan-vogel</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/jrnlphil/epistemic-bootstrapping-jonathan-vogel#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2009 16:32:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Cullison</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[The Journal of Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bootstrapping]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemic circularity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemic externalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemic internalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemic justification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reliabilism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=535</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>The Journal of Philosophy, volume CV, number 9 (September 2008), pages 518-539.</strong></p>
<p><em>Main authors discussed:</em> Stewart Cohen, James Van Cleve, Michael Bergmann (Bergmann discussed in the Appendix)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Jonathan Vogel  revisits his bootstrapping argument against reliabilism and defends it from the charge that internalism&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/jrnlphil/epistemic-bootstrapping-jonathan-vogel/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>4</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>&#8220;Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions&#8221; Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew</title>
		<link>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/fallibilism-epistemic-possibility-and-concessive-knowledge-attributions-trent-dougherty-and-patrick-rysiew</link>
		<comments>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/fallibilism-epistemic-possibility-and-concessive-knowledge-attributions-trent-dougherty-and-patrick-rysiew#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 20:29:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Clayton Littlejohn</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fallibilism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Knowledge]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.philosophersdigest.com/?p=319</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p><em>Main authors discussed</em>: David Lewis and Jason Stanley</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fallibilist claims that it’s possible to know p even if your evidence for believing p does not entail p.  It seems that infallibilism entails scepticism because it seems that we don’t have&#8230;</p>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.philosophersdigest.com/philphen/fallibilism-epistemic-possibility-and-concessive-knowledge-attributions-trent-dougherty-and-patrick-rysiew/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>7</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
