“Sober on Intelligent Design Theory and The Intelligent Designer” John Beaudoin
0 Comments Main authors discussed: Elliot Sober, Michael Behe, William Dembski
John Beaudoin responds to an article by Sober that appeared in a previous issue of Faith and Philosophy.* Sober’s position in that piece is that Intelligent Design Theory (IDT), when combined with independently plausible assumptions, entails the existence of a supernatural creator. Thus, Sober concludes, IDT is not neutral on the subject of the identity of the designer, despite what many of its proponents claim. Beaudoin tries to show that Sober’s argument fails.
Beaudoin supplies a helpful summary of Sober’s argument, which I reproduce below. Sober takes the first premise to be the central thesis of IDT. The other steps in the argument, with the exception of number two, are supposed to be readily acceptable even by those who reject IDT. (Sober presents an argument for the second premise that relies upon the way in which various components of mental life seem to depend upon one another):
- If a system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it was caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
- Some of the minds found in nature are irreducibly complex.
- Therefore, some of the minds found in nature were caused to exist by an intelligent designer.
- Any mind in nature that designs and builds an irreducibly complex system is itself irreducibly complex.
- If the universe is finitely old and if cause precedes effect, then at least one of the minds found in nature was not created by any mind found in nature.
- The universe is finitely old.
- Causes precede their effects.
- Therefore, there exists a supernatural intelligent designer.
Beaudoin poses two questions in response to Sober’s argument. First, does it succeed in showing that IDT entails a supernatural designer? Second, if it does, what are the implications supposed to be for public policy issues? He does not address the second of these questions (nor does Sober) except to point out that its answer depends upon further arguments in philosophy of science and constitutional law.
His answer to the first question is negative. He begins by casting doubt on Sober’s claim that premise one is the central thesis of IDT, pointing out that Michael Behe–the main proponent of the concept of irreducible complexity–has been careful to restrict its operation to physical systems. Beaudoin concludes that the first premise must at the very least be reformulated to read: “If a physical system found in nature is irreducibly complex, then it was caused to exist by an intelligent designer.” (435) He pushes the point further, however, arguing that even this reformulated statement does not represent the central thesis of IDT. Instead, he thinks of IDT as making two basic claims. The first is that there exist general rules for determining whether things are the product of intelligence and that attempting to articulate these rules “is the proper subject matter of what might be called the science of intelligent design.” (437) The second is that these rules yield the result that some structures we find in nature are the product of intelligence. According to Beaudoin, the second of these is best thought of as the central thesis of IDT. Notice that it makes no reference to irreducible complexity for, as he points out, there are various alternative arguments to the conclusion of design put forth within IDT.
Now if we try to run Sober’s argument, using as the central claim of IDT that some structures found in nature are the product of intelligence, we are very unlikely, Beaudoin thinks, to find that a supernatural designer is entailed by any set of auxiliary premises Sober is willing to accept. In particular, it would seem that one of those premises would have to be something like the following: “Intelligent designers cannot evolve through natural processes.” Otherwise, Beaudoin’s proposal for the central thesis clearly leaves open the possibility of alien, but non-supernatural, intelligence being behind the design we find in nature. Beaudoin concludes that Sober’s argument fails, except, perhaps, when applied to certain carefully-specified versions of intelligent design theory.
Reviewed by John Milliken
Bowling Green State University
