“The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief” James A. Montmarquet
0 Comments Main authors discussed: Robert Adams, Philippa Foot, William Clifford
Discussions of responsibility tend to center around issues of control, with the usual assumption being that the greater control we have over something the more responsibility we bear for it. James Montmarquet is interested particularly in responsibility for belief, which he argues is limited but nevertheless important. His suggestion is that we ought to think about control over belief in terms of our control over certain epistemic virtues.
Montmarquet begins by describing three distinct levels of virtue that differ in the amount of freedom they allow to their possessor. Those with the least are a type of epistemic virtue that involves “qualities of cognitive effort.” (374) His main example here is open-mindedness. The middle level consists of what he calls motivational virtues, like courage. Finally, those virtues in which we have the greatest range of freedom are the “substantive moral virtues,” which include kindness and justice. This synopsis is admittedly brief; I will return to his discussion of these different levels in a moment.For now, I want to turn to three kinds of cases he thinks are particularly salient for a discussion of the voluntariness of belief. Though we often think of belief as involuntary, he claims, here are instances where people are held responsible for their beliefs:
- We hold responsible when beliefs result in pernicious actions, as when a belief that stealing is okay leads to stealing or a mistaken belief that a ship is seaworthy leads to sending passengers to their deaths.
- Certain religious traditions teach that God holds individuals responsible for what they believe.
- We judge individuals blameworthy for holding beliefs we think they ought clearly to recognize as false.
Montmarquet argues that belief is not voluntary, if by that we mean under our direct control. On the other hand, it makes sense to hold people accountable for their beliefs because the epistemic virtues whose exercise, or lack thereof, in part controls the formation of our beliefs, are under our direct control. In his words: “On the account proposed here, belief is (relatively) ‘involuntary’ in that such virtues as are typically implicated in the formation and retention of belief – if they are subject to the will at all – are subject to it only in the very limited way described above, in section II. At the same time, belief is ‘voluntary’ in that these virtues are – if only in a very attenuated way – directly subject to the will.” (385)
Part of this quotation needs to be explained. What is the “very limited way described above”? He is referring here to the epistemic virtues, which he thinks of as limited for two reasons. First, to attempt to exercise these virtues is to succeed in doing so; there is no difference, for instance, between trying to have an open mind and having an open mind. (375) Second, the vices that correspond to these virtues are in some sense self-correcting. When one becomes aware of being closed-minded, he suggests, this is itself the beginning of being open-minded. It would be useful here to give a more detailed account on the other two levels of virtue mentioned above and how he sees them differing from the epistemic virtues in terms of voluntariness. Unfortunately, his discussion of these matters is very obscure. It is not at all clear from his paper how the three levels can be clearly distinguished, nor how they form a continuum of voluntariness.
He closes his paper by addressing the three cases outlined above, showing how holding individuals in each case responsible for their beliefs makes sense in light of the epistemic virtues involved. Overall his account is interesting and suggestive, but in need of significant clarification in his discussion of the three categories of virtue.
Reviewed by John Milliken
Bowling Green State University
Tags: Belief, Responsibility, Virtue
